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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive outline
of the different threads of work in Explainable AI
Planning (XAIP) that has emerged as a focus area
in the last couple of years, and contrast that with
earlier efforts in the field in terms of techniques,
target users, and delivery mechanisms. We hope
that the survey will provide guidance to new re-
searchers in automated planning towards the role
of explanations in the effective design of human-in-
the-loop systems, as well as provide the established
researcher with some perspective on the evolution
of the exciting world of explainable planning.
1 Introduction
As AI techniques mature, issues of interfacing with users has
emerged as one of the primary challenges facing the AI com-
munity. Primary among these challenges is for AI-based sys-
tems to be able to explain their reasoning to humans in the
loop [26]. This is necessary both for collaborative interac-
tions where humans and AI systems solve problems together,
as well as in establishing trust with end users in general.
Among the work in this direction in the broader AI commu-
nity, in this survey, we focus on how the automated planning
community in particular has responded to this challenge.
One of the recent developments towards this end is the es-
tablishment of the Explainable AI Planning (XAIP) Work-
shop1 at the International Conference on Automated Planning
and Scheduling (ICAPS), the premier conference in the field.
The agenda of the workshop states:
While XAI at large is primarily concerned with black-box
learning-based approaches, model-based approaches
are well suited – arguably better suited – for an expla-
nation, and Explainable AI Planning (XAIP) can play an
important role in helping users interface with AI tech-
nologies in complex decision-making procedures.
In general, this is true for sequential decision making tasks
for a variety of reasons. The complexity of automated plan-
ning and decision making, and consequently the role of ex-
plainability in it, raises many more challenges than function
∗Equal contribution.
1https://kcl-planning.github.io/XAIP-Workshops/
approximation tasks (e.g. classification) as was originally fo-
cused on [25] by the XAI Program from DARPA. This in-
cludes dealing with complex constraints over problems in-
tractable to the human’s inferential capabilities, differences
in human expectations and mental models, to proving prove-
nance of various artifacts of a system’s decision making pro-
cess over long term interactions even as the world evolves
around it. Furthermore, these typically deal with reasoning
tasks where we tend to seek explanations anyway in human-
human interactions, as opposed to perception tasks.
Thus, the original DARPA XAI program [25], which
served as a great catalyst towards advancing research in ex-
plainable AI, has also seen evolution [26] of its core focus
from machine learning to the broader sense of artificial intel-
ligence, particularly decision making tasks. Recent surveys
on the topic [1] also recognize this lacuna. As the issue of
explainability becomes front and center in AI, the importance
of long term decision making cannot be avoided [63]. This is
highlighted by the emergence of XAI-subcommunities within
planning, multi-agents, and other communities at premier AI
conferences, including the Explainable AI (XAI) Workshop2
at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI) and the Explainable Transparent Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (EXTRAAMAS) Work-
shop3 at the International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), which in addition to the
XAIP Workshop mentioned above, has captured the imagina-
tion of this emerging field of inquiry.
Survey Scope and Outline In this survey, we highlight the
role of explanations in the many unique dimensions of a de-
cision making problem, particularly automated planning, and
provide a comprehensive survey of recent work in this direc-
tion. In particular, we will focus on automated planning as
a subfield of decision making problems in order to adhere to
the limitations of a six page survey but we will point to work
in the broader area wherever necessary to highlight themes
of explainable planning in general. To this end, we will start
with a brief overview of the different kinds of users associated
with a automated decision making task and the considerations
for an explanation in each case. We then introduce various as-
pects of a planning task formally and delve into a survey of
2https://sites.google.com/view/xai2019
3https://extraamas.ehealth.hevs.ch
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existing works that tackle the explanation problem in one or
more of these dimensions, while comparing and contrasting
the properties of such explanations. Finally, we will conclude
with a summary of emerging trends in XAIP research.
In the survey, we focus exclusively on explanations of a
plan as a solution of a given planning problem. We will not
cover meta planning problems such as goal reasoning [52;
13; 43], or open world considerations in the explanation of
plans that fail [27]. We will also not cover novel behaviors
in pursuit of explainability: e.g. the generation of explicable
plans [66] that conform to user expectations and are thus not
required to be explained, or the design of environments to
facilitate the same [37]. For a detailed treatise of the same,
we refer the reader to [9]. Other topics excluded are execution
time considerations, such as in [40].
2 The Many Faces of XAIP
The primary considerations in the design of explainable sys-
tems is the consideration of the persona of the explainee. This
is true for explaianble AI in general [67] but also acknowl-
edged to be crucial to the XAIP scene as well [39].
- End user: This is the person who interacts with the sys-
tem in the form of a user. For a planning system, this
may be the human teammate in a human-robot team [11]
who is impacted by, or is a direct stakeholder in the plans
of the robot, or user collaborating with an automated
planner in a decision support setting [24].
- Domain Designer: This is the person involved in the
acquisition of the model that the system works with: e.g.
the designer of goal-oriented conversation systems [55].
- Algorithm Designer: The final persona is that of the de-
veloper of the algorithms themselves: e.g. in the context
of automated planning systems, this could be someone
working on informed search.
Though [39] does not make an explicit distinction, for most
real-world applications, the domain designer is distinct from
the algorithm designer and may even not have any overlap in
expertise (e.g. [55]). As we go into details of different forms
of XAIP techniques, we will see how they cater to the needs
of one or more of these personas (c.f. Figure 1).
3 The Decision Making Problem
A sequential decision making or planning problem Π is de-
fined in terms of a transition function δΠ : A × S → S × R,
where A is the set of capabilities available to the agent, S
is the set of states it can be in, and the real number denotes
the cost of making the transition. The planning algorithm A
solves Π subject to a desired property τ to produce a plan or
policy pi, i.e. A : Π× τ 7→ pi. Here, τ may represent different
properties such as soundness, optimality, and so on.
• Plan pi = 〈ai, a2, . . . , an〉, ai ∈ A that transforms the
current state I ∈ S of the agent to its goal G ∈ S, i.e.
δΠ(pi, I) = 〈G,
∑
ai∈pi ci〉. The second term in the out-
put denotes the plan cost c(pi). The optimal plan is pi∗.
Algorithm-based Model-based Explanations
Explanations Inference Resolution Model Reconciliation
End User 7 3 3
Domain Designer 7 3 n/a
Algorithm Designer 3 7 7
Table 1: The many faces of XAIP.
• Policy pi : s 7→ a, a ∈ A,∀ s ∈ S provides a mapping
from any state s of the agent to the desired action a to be
taken in that state. The optimal policy is pi∗.
While specific decision making tasks have more nuanced
definitions characterizing what forms states and actions can
take, how the transition function is defined, etc. for the pur-
poses of this survey, this abstraction should be enough for the
general audience to grasp the salient features of a decision
making task and relevant XAIP concepts.
3.1 The Explanation Process
The explanation process of a planning problem proceeds as
follows, with a question from the explainee about the current
solution of a given planning problem, and the explainer (the
XAIP system) coming up with an explanation for it:
Q. “Why pi?” or “Why not pi′?”
Here, pi′ is a foil [46] and may be either stated explicitly,
implicitly, or even partially (leading to a set of foils) in
the questions. Examples of foils would be:
- “Why a 6∈ pi?” is a partial foil where all plans with
action a in them are the foils.
- The original question “Why pi?” where the implicit
foil is “as opposed to all other plans pi′”.
A. An explanation E such that the explainee can compute
A : Π× τ 7→ pi and verify that either
A : Π× τ 67→ pi′; or
A : Π× τ 7→ pi′ but pi ≡ pi′ or pi > pi′ (the criterion
for comparison may be cost, preferences, etc.).
The point of an explanation is thus to establish the property
τ of the solution pi given a planning problem Π. The Q&A
continues until the explainee is satisfied. The content of an
explanation E can vary greatly depending on the needs of the
explainee (Figure 1). This is the topic of discussion next.
3.2 Explanation Artifacts: Algorithm/Model/Plan
Clearly, from the definition of the decision making task
above, there are many components at play here which can
contribute to an explanation of a plan. The system can ex-
plain the steps made in A while solving a problem to the
debugger / algorithm designer. It can also explain artifacts
of the problem description Π that led to the decision: these
are model-based algorithm-agnostic explanations. These are
more useful to end users. The system can also communicate
characteristics of pi as an explanation.
It is interesting to note that this sort of a distinction can be
seen in the literature on explainable machine learning as well.
For example, LIME [48] interfaces with the explainee at the
level of outputs only, i.e. the classification choices made (cor-
responding to plans computed in our setting) – it is also al-
gorithm dependent since it reveals (albeit simplified) details
of the learned model to the user. Approaches like [50], on
the other hand, are purely algorithm dependent requiring the
explainee to visualize the internal representations learned by
the algorithm at hand. Other works such as [14] provide al-
gorithm independent explanations in terms of the input data
and black box learners, similar to model-based explanations
in our case that use the input problem definition as the basis
of an explanation and not the inference engine.
3.3 Properties of Explanations
Existing literature on explainable artificial intelligence, as
well as studies on explanations in human-human interactions,
surface recurring themes used to characterize explanations.
Social, Selective, and Contrastive Looking at how hu-
mans explain their decisions to each other can provide great
insight on the desired properties of an explanation. Miller in
[46] provides an insightful survey of lessons learned from so-
cial sciences and how they can impact the informed design of
explainable AI systems. He outlines three key properties for
consideration: social in being able to model the expectations
of the explainee, selective in being able to select explanations
among several competing hypothesis, and contrastive in be-
ing able to differentiate properties of two competing hypoth-
esis. The contrastive property in particular has received a lot
of attention [29; 47] in the XAIP community.
Local versus Global Explanations Another consideration
is whether an explanation is geared towards a particular deci-
sion (local), e.g. LIME [48], or they are for the entire model
(global), e.g. TCAV [33] – for a planning problem this dis-
tinction can manifest in many ways: whether the explanation
is for a given plan versus if it is for the model in general.
Abstractions One final approach we want to highlight is
the use of abstractions: this is especially useful if the model
of decision-making is too complex for the explainee and a
simplified model can provide more useful feedback. [48]
4 Algorithm-based Explanations
We first look at attempts to explain the underlying planning
algorithm. This is quite useful for debugging: e.g. [42] pro-
vides an interactive visualization of the search tree for a given
problem. Another case is where the explanation methods are
particularly tailored for specific algorithms. Such explanatory
methods have become quite common in explaining decisions
generated by deep reinforcement learning. For example, au-
thors in [22] look at the possibility of generating perturbation
based saliency maps for explaining a policy learned by Asyn-
chronous Advantage Actor-Critic Algorithms, while authors
in [35] look at learning finite-state representation (a Moore
machine) that can represent RL policies learned by RNNs.
5 Model-based Explanations
Majority of works in XAIP look at algorithm-agnostic meth-
ods for generating explanations since properties of a solu-
tion can be evaluated independently of the method used to
come up with it, given the model of the decision making
task. As opposed to debugging settings where the algorithm
has to be investigated in more detail, end users typically care
about model-based algorithm-agnostic explanations more so
that services [5] can be built around it. Approaches in this
category deal with two considerations: 1) the inferential ca-
pability; and/or 2) the mental model of the user. When both
of these are aligned, there is no need to explain.
5.1 Inference Reconciliation
Users have considerably less computational ability (let’s say
AH ) than a planner. In this situation:
A : Π× τ 7→ pi and AH : Π× τ 67→ pi
An explanation here is supposed to reconcile the inferential
power of the user and the planner:
AH : Π× τ E−→ pi
In order to help the inference process of the user, there are
usually two broad approaches (not necessarily exclusive): (a)
Allow the user to raise specific questions about a plan and
engage in explanatory dialogue; and (b) leverage abstraction
techniques to allow the user to better understand the plan.
Investigatory Dialogue With a few exceptions, most of the
methods that engage in explanatory dialogue look at queries
contrasting the given plan with a foil (implicit or explicit).
Q1: “Why is this action in this plan or why a ∈ pi?”
One of the most well-known approaches for answering this
[51; 2] use a causal link chain originating at a that can be
traced to the goal. The explanations is thus a subset of the
model E ⊆ Π that effectively explains the role of the ac-
tion by pointing out the preconditions of successive actions
that are being supported by the plan in question. While the
original paper [51] does not specifically talk about any selec-
tion criterion for the explanation content, recent work [6] has
shown how the information can be minimized.
Q2: “Why not this other plan pi′?”
This is the case where a contrastive foil is explicitly consid-
ered. Authors in [5; 36] assume that the foils specified by the
user can be best understood as constraints on the plans they
are expecting: e.g. a certain action/action-sequence to be in-
cluded/excluded. The explanation is then to identify an exem-
plary plan that satisfies those constraints thus demonstrating
how the computed plan is better. Authors in [16], on the other
hand, expect the user queries to be expressed in terms of plan
properties which are user-defined binary properties that apply
to all valid plans for the decision problem. The explanation
then takes the form of other plan properties that are entailed
by those properties. This is computed using oversubscription
planning with plan properties reflecting goals.
Q3: “Why is this policy optimal, i.e. pi(s) = a∧pi(s) 6= a′?”
Such questions are pursued particularly in the context of
MDPs: authors in [32] phrase explanations in terms of the fre-
quency with which the current action would lead the agent to
high-value states, while authors in [15] looked at such ques-
tions in a specific application context with explanations that
show how the action allows for the execution of more de-
sirable actions later. The latter additionally employs a case-
based explanation technique to provide historical precedents
about the results of the actions. Authors in [30] answer
questions over a being preferred over a′ by illustrating how
the actions affect the total value in terms of various human-
understandable components of the reward function.
Among these works, [32; 15; 30; 16] aim for minimal ex-
planations as a means of selection.
Q4: “Why is Π not solvable?”
There are several ways to surface to the user the constraints
in the problem that are leading to unsolvability.
Excuse One approach would be to transform the given
problem to a new one so that the updated problem is now
solvable and provide the model fix as an explanation of why
the original problem was unsolvable.
Π→ Π′ so that A : Π′ × τ 67→ φ
E ← Π∆Π′
These are called excuses [20]: here the authors identify a
set of static initial facts to update by framing it as a planning
problem. It is possible to impose selection strategies in this
framework by associating costs to the various excuses.
Abstraction An alternative transformation on the problem
would be to find a simpler version of the given problem which
is still unsolvable and highlight the problems there.
E ← Abs(Π) so that A : E × τ 7→ φ
These are called model abstractions and have been used
in [58; 60] to reduce the computational burden on the user.
The approach in [60] also leverages temporal abstractions in
the form of intermediate subgoals to illustrate why possible
foils fail. Use of abstractions is, of course, not confined to
explanations of unsolvability: recent work [41] used abstract
models defined over simpler user-defined features to generate
explanations for reinforcement learning problems in terms of
action influence. The methods discussed in [51] also allows
for the generation of causal link explanations for planning
settings that involve abstract tasks, such as in HTN planning
[19]. The use of plan properties by [16] and subsets of state
factors in [32] are more examples of the use of abstraction
schemes to simplify the explanation process.
Certificates Finally, authors in [17] look at a different way
to approach the unsolvability issue by creating inductive cer-
tificates for the initial states that captures all reachable states.
They have also investigated axiomatic systems that can gen-
erate proofs for task unsolvability [18]. Such certificates (rep-
resented, for example, as a binary decision diagram) can be
quite complicated and are not meant to be consumed by end
users, but provide useful debugging information to domain
designers, algorithm designers, and AI assistants.
5.2 Model Reconciliation
One of the recurring themes in human-machine interaction is
the “mental models” of users [4] – users of software systems
often come with their own preconceived notions and expecta-
tions of the system that may ore may not be borne out by the
ground truth. For a planning system, this means that even if
it is making the best plans it could, the human-in-the-loop is
evaluating those plans with a different model, i.e. their mental
model of the problem, and may not agree to its quality. Dif-
ferences in models between the user and the machine appear
in many settings, such as in drifting world models over long
terms interactions [3], search and rescue settings where there
are internal and external agents with different views into the
world [11], in intelligent tutoring systems between the stu-
dent and the instructor [23], in smart rooms with distributed
sensors [6], and so on. This model difference, along with in-
ferential limitations of the human, is thus the root cause of
the need for explanations from the end user persona.
In [12], the seminal work on this topic, authors posit that
explanations can no longer be a “soliloquy“ in the agent’s
own model but must instead consider and explain in terms of
these model differences. The process of explanations is then
one of reconciliation of the systems model and the human
mental model so that both can agree on the property τ of the
decision being made. Thus, if ΠH is the mental model of the
user, the model reconciliation process requires that:
Given: A : Π× τ 7→ pi
ΠH + E → ΠˆH such that A : ΠˆH × τ 7→ pi.
In the original work, the mental model was assumed to be
known and reconciliation was achieved through a search in
the space of models induced by the difference between the
system model and the mental model, until a model is found
where τ holds. The difference between this intermediate
model and the mental model is provided as an explanation.
Social Such explanations are inherently social in being able
to explicitly capture the effect of expectations in the explana-
tion process. Indeed, in user studies conducted in [10], it was
shown that participants were indeed able to identify the cor-
rect τ based on an explanation. Note that, in the model recon-
ciliation framework, the mental model is just a version of the
decision making problem at hand which the agent believes
the user is operating under. This may be a graph, a planning
problem, or even a logic program [62]. The notion of model
reconciliation is agnostic to the actual representation.
Contrastive The contrastive nature of these explanations
comes from how the model update preserves τ of the given
plan as opposed to the foil, which may be implicitly [12] or
explicitly [58] provided. This is also closely tied with the
selection process of those model updates.
Selective In [12], the explanation content was selected
based on minimality of model update: min |Π∆ΠH |. The
minimal explanation is not unique and it was shown in [65]
how users attribute different value to theoretically equivalent
model updates, thereby motivating further research on how to
select among several competing explanations for the user.
Model Reconciliation Expansion Pack
The last couple of years have seen extensive work on this
topic. primarily focused on relaxing the assumptions made on
the mental model in the original model reconciliation work,
and expanding the scope of problems addressed by it. We
expound on a few of them below.
Figure 1: Recent trends in XAIP illustrate burst in model reconciliation approaches acknowledging the need to account for the mental model
of the user in the explanation process. Also noticeable is an encouraging uptick in willingness of the community to engage in user studies.
Size of a circle is proportional to the number of papers in a year, smallest being 1. Note that 2020 is still in progress.
Explanation Type Social Contrastive Selective Local Global Abstraction User Study
Algorithm-based explanations [30] [30; 22; 35] [30; 22; 42; 35] [35] [22; 42]
Model-based explanations Inference Reconciliation
[58; 60; 16; 55; 41;
30]
[51; 2; 58; 60; 16; 55; 20;
32; 15; 17; 41; 30; 5]
[22; 51; 2; 58; 60; 16;
55; 20; 32; 15; 41; 30]
[51; 22; 2; 58; 60; 16; 55;
20; 32; 15; 17; 41; 30; 5]
[60; 16; 55;
20]
[58; 60; 16;
55; 32; 41]
[2; 22; 60;
32; 15; 41]
Model Reconciliation [12; 58; 60; 55; 57;
56; 11; 54; 6; 62; 8]
[12; 58; 60; 55; 57; 56;
11; 54; 6; 62; 8]
[12; 58; 60; 55; 57; 56;
11; 54; 6; 62; 8]
[12; 58; 57; 56; 11; 54;
6]
[12; 60; 55] [58; 60; 55] [10; 60; 56;
11; 8]
Plan-based explanations [38; 6; 49] [64; 35; 59; 61; 28; 38;
34; 6; 49]
[64; 35; 59; 61; 28; 38;
34; 6; 49; 31]
[64; 35; 59;
61; 28; 49]
[59; 38]
Table 2: Summary of results. Note for reviewers: We had to go with the plain bib format so we can tabulate the paper numbers.
Model Uncertainty One of the primary directions of work
has been in considering uncertainty about the mental model.
In [57], authors show how to reconcile with a set of possi-
ble mental models {ΠHi } and also demonstrate how the same
framework can be used to explain to multiple users in the
loop. In [58], on the other hand, the authors estimate the
mental model from the provided foil.
Inference Reconciliation The original work on model rec-
onciliation assumed an user with identical inferential capa-
bility (optimal or sound as the case may be) to the planner.
However, as we saw previously, much of XAIP has been
about dealing with the computational limits of users. Model
reconciliation approaches have started adapting to this [58;
60] by identifying from the given foil the simplest abstraction
of their model to explain in. [60] provides further inferential
assistance in the form of unmet subgoals.
Unsolvability An important aspect of human-planner inter-
action, where inferential limitations play an outsized part, is
the case of unsolvability. An interesting case of this is re-
cently explored in [55] where the domain acquisition prob-
lem has been cast into the model reconciliation framework,
reusing [60] to help out the domain designer persona when
they cannot figure out why their domain has no solutions or
the solutions do not match their expectation.
Model-free Model Reconciliation So far, model reconcil-
iation has considered the mental model explicitly. This may
not be necessary. At the end of the day, the explanation in-
cludes information regarding the agent model and what it in-
clude and do not include. The mental model only helps the
system to filter what new information is relevant to the user.
Thus an alternative would be to predict how model informa-
tion can affect the expectation of the user [56] by learning
a labeling model that takes a state-action-state tuple, a subset
of information about the system’s model and whether the user
after receiving the information would find this tuple explica-
ble. The learned model then drives the search to determine
what information should be exposed to the user.
Lies and Deception A consequence of going “model-free”
is that the explanations provided may no longer be true but
rather be whatever users find to be satisfying. In the origi-
nal work on model reconciliation, E was always constrained
to be consistent with the ground truth Π. Authors in [8;
7] have shown how this constraint can be relaxed to hijack
the model reconciliation process into producing false expla-
nations, opening up intriguing avenues of further research
into the ethics of mental modeling in planning.
6 Plan-based Explanations
Finally, we look at the role of plans in explanatory dialogue.
Works like [53; 44] have explored explanans in the form of
a plan that explains a set of observations. Beyond human-
AI interaction, the qualitative structure of plans has also been
used for problems like plan-reuse and validation [31].
Plan / Policy Summarization With regards to the role of
plans in explanatory dialogue, one area we want to high-
light in greater detail is that of plan or policy summarization.
When the system is generating solutions over long time hori-
zons and over large state spaces, presentation of the plan or
policy to the user becomes difficult. One way to approach
this issue is through verbalization of plans: e.g. paths taken
by a robot [49] along different dimensions of interest such as
levels of abstraction, specificity, and locality. Recent work
has also attempted at domain-independent methods for plan
summarization [6] by using the model reconciliation process
with an empty mental model to compute the minimal subset
of causal links required to justify each action in a plan.
Another possibility is to use abstraction schemes to sim-
plify the decision structure and allow the user to drill down
as required. [61] looks at the possibility of employing state
abstraction that project out low importance features. On the
other hand, [59] generates temporal abstractions for a given
policy by automatically extracting subgoals. [64] takes ad-
vantage of both schemes by mapping policies learned through
Deep Q-learning methods to a policy for a semi-aggregated
MDP that employs both user-specified state aggregation fea-
tures and temporally extended actions in the form of skills
automatically generated from the learned policy.
Another possibility would be to allow the user to ask ques-
tions about generated policies: e.g. “Under what conditions
is action ai performed”? This was investigated in [28], where
both queries and answers were expressed in terms of user-
specified features. [34] looked at cases where the user is not
just interested in learning details of the model underlying the
current decisions but rather how it differs from possible alter-
natives, by using LTL formulas that are true in a target set of
plan traces but are not satisfied by a specified alternate set.
A different approach is taken by [38] where authors pro-
pose to present to users partial plans that they can figure out
completions based on their knowledge of the task, by using
various psychologically feasible computational models (e.g.
models inspired by inverse reinforcement learning and imita-
tion learning) that people could have.
7 Emerging Landscape
This survey provides an overview of the many flavors of ex-
plainable planning and decision making and current trends in
the field. While the works explored here are mostly after-the-
fact explanations, i.e. after a plan has been computed (or no
plan has been found) given a planning problem, there is re-
cent work [11] demonstrating how the possibility of having
to explain its decisions can be folded into an agent’s reason-
ing stage itself. This is a well-known phenomenon in human
behavior: we are known to make better decisions when we
are asked to explain them [45]. By adopting a similar philos-
ophy, we can potentially achieve better, more human-aware,
behavior in XAIP-enabled agents as well.
Early attempts at this, employing search in the space of
models [11], had proved computationally prohibitive. How-
ever, recent work [54] has shown that achieving such behavior
is computationally no harder than its classical planning coun-
terpart! Furthermore, recognizing that plans are not made in
vacuum but often in the context of interactions with end users,
can lead to a more efficient planning process with explainable
components than without, for example, in collaborative plan-
ning scenarios [24] or in anytime planners that can preserve
high-level constraints in partial plans as it plans along [21].
As the XAIP community comes to terms with its own accu-
racy versus efficiency trade-offs, parallel to similar arguments
in the XAI community at large, a whole new world of possi-
bilities open up in imbuing established planning approaches
with the latest and best XAIP-components.
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